

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

3914

~~ACTION~~

July 13, 1973

Done. BO

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM: WILLIAM L. STEARMAN *WLS*

SUBJECT: USG Contact with South Vietnamese Third Force

Our Paris Embassy recently has broken a long-standing rule against official contact with South Vietnamese third force personalities in France. We believe that these contacts are most ill-advised and recommend that you ask State to instruct the Embassy to discontinue further such meetings.



25X1
25X1

On two occasions, within the past 10 days, an Embassy officer has met with leading third force figures in Paris. It is unclear at whose initiative these contacts were held but presumably they were sought by our personnel or the reports would have indicated otherwise. The individuals in question are in contact with the "PRG" and their exile association for the "third force" element on the National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord.

We believe the rationale for avoiding contact with third forces in Paris continues to apply and see even less reason for breaking the practice against Embassy meetings. The GVN considers -- and we agree -- that the exiles are opportunists of the first rank without any political following in the South. To meet with them would only inflate their credentials, lend our name to their very dubious cause and risk involving ourselves in controversy with the GVN over the NCNRC. Saigon is extremely sensitive on the NCNRC issue, which it considers an internal political matter, and would resent -- and possibly misconstrue -- official contact by USG officials with a group that the GVN has spurned and denounced.

DOS, NSS,
review completed
- pgs 1-15

MORI/CDF
C05106399 pgs
2-16 match pgs
1-15 of target

~~SECRET~~

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY page 16

SECRET

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We have brought our views to the attention of State Department working levels without much effect. The Department has cabled the Embassy that it concurs in its line (to be noncommittal with the Third Forces) but failed to discourage further contacts.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you inform State to cease further meetings between third forces and Paris Embassy officials.

APPROVE

HK

DISAPPROVE

Who authorized it to begin with?

SECRET

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CONFIDENTIAL

July 17, 1973

General

MEMO FOR:

~~JON HOWE~~

FROM:

WILLIAM STEARMAN *MS*

SUBJECT:

Paris Embassy Contacts
with Vietnamese Third
Forces

Per your request, attached are the back-up cables reporting and commenting on ill-advised contacts between our Paris Embassy and South Vietnamese third-forces.

Attachments

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Department of State

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PAGE 01 STATE 136451

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ORIGIN EA-14

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ADP-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03

INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-15

USIA-12 IO-13 ACDA-19 NIC-01 /138 R

DRAFTED BY EA/VN:PCOLLINS:AOA
7/12/73 EXT 23221
APPROVED BY EA/VN:L.B.ASKEW

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P 121905Z JUL 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY SAIGON PRIORITY
INFO USDEL JEC PARIS PRIORITY

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- SONNENFELDT
- V. I. G. _____
- WALSH _____

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 136451

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINT VS
SUBJECT: SOUTH VIETNAMESE "THIRD FORCE" CONTACTS WITH PRG
AND GVN

REFS: A, SAIGON 12500, B, PARIS 18871

WE CONCUR IN LINE TAKEN WITH MINH BY EMBASSY OFFICER
(REF B) AND IN EMBASSY SAIGON COMMENTS (REF A). ROGERS

B

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 SAIGON 12500 120004Z

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ACTION EA-14

FILE COPY

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ADP-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-02 M

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- V.L.G. _____
- WALSH _____

*B
C*

P R 111058Z JUL 73
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4449
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
INFO USDEL JEC PARIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SAIGON 12500

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINT VS
SUBJECT: SOUTH VIETNAMESE "THIRD FORCE" CONTACTS WITH PRG AND GVN

REF: (A) PARIS 18363; (B) PARIS 18871; (C) FBIS S101222 JUNE

1. REFTELS REPORTED RECENT EMBASSY PARIS EMBOFF'S CONVERSATIONS WITH SELF-STYLED LEADERS OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE "THIRD FORCE" HO THONG MINH AND NGUYEN HUU CHAU. REF (B) REPORTS THAT MINH, AFTER REPORTING RECENT CONTACTS WITH PRG DEL CHIEF NGUYEN VAN HIEU, COMPLAINED OF "LACK OF RESPONSIVENESS" OF GVN TO "THIRD FORCE" APPROACHES. MINH THEN SUGGESTED THAT THE US AND DRV MIGHT USEFULLY "INDICATE FORCEFULLY" TO PRESIDENT THIEU THAT HE SHOULD ADOPT A MORE RESPONSIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE "THIRD FORCE".

2. WE BELIEVE EMBASSY PARIS' RESPONSES TO MINH HAVE STRUCK THE RIGHT NOTE. SOUTH VIETNAMESE POLITICAL PROBLEMS MUST OF COURSE BE SOLVED BY THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE THEMSELVES AND THE LESS OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE IN SUCH MATTERS THE BETTER. WE BELIEVE THIS SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE OUR LINE WITH MINH, CHAU, AND OTHER EXPATRIATES.

3. FYI, GVN PRESS SPOKESMAN JULY 10 REACTED TO STORIES OF

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PAGE 02 SAIGON 12500 120004Z

PRG- "THIRD FORCE" CONTACTS IN PARIS THAT EXPATRIATES INVOLVED IN SUCH ACTIVITIES "REPRESENT NO ONE" (REF C). GVN WOULD, WE BELIEVE, VIEW ANY U.S. ENCOURAGEMENT OF "THIRD FORCE" ELEMENTS WITH SUSPICION AND RESENTMENT.
WHITEHOUSE

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ACTION EA-14

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ADP-00 IO-13 DPW-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00
PM-07 H-02 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-03 RSC-01
PRS-01 SS-15 USIA-12 RSR-01 /119 W

NCAC

046434

R 101736Z JUL 73
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1660
INFO AMEMBASSY SAIGON

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 18871

Z.C. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINT, VS
SUBJECT: SOUTH VIETNAMESE "THIRD FORCE" CONTACTS WITH PRG AND GVN

REF: PARIS 18363

BEGIN SUMMARY. SOUTH VIETNAMESE "THIRD FORCE" FIGURE (HO THONG MINH) EXPLAINED TO EMBOFF THE BACKGROUND OF THE JULY 7 MEETING BETWEEN "THIRD FORCE" LEADERS AND THE HEAD OF THE PRG DELEGATION NGUYEN VAN HIEU. MINH LAMENTED LACK OF GVN RESPONSE TO SIMULTANEOUS DEMARCHE. MINH ASKED WHETHER US HAD ANY SUGGESTIONS TO MAKE TO HIM PRIOR TO DINNER WITH HIEU JULY 12. END SUMMARY.

1. SOUTH VIETNAMESE "THIRD FORCE" FIGURE, HO THONG MINH, CALLED ON EMBOFF TO EXPLAIN RECENT CONTACTS WITH PRG AND GVN LEADERS IN PARIS. ACCORDING TO MINH, ON JULY 4 A GROUP OF "THIRD FORCE" ORGANIZATIONS LOUSELY FEDFRATED UNDER THE NAME OF "COMMITTEE FOR EACE AND DEMOCRATIC LIBERTIES IN SOUTH VIETNAM" SENT LETTERS TO HEAD OF THE PRG DELEGATION (NGUYEN VAN HIEU) AND HEAD OF THE GVN DELEGATION (NGUYEN LOU VIEN). THE LETTERS PROPOSED MEETINGS BETWEEN THE COMMITTEE AND THE GVN AND PRG REPRESENTATIVES. ON JULY 6, THE PRG REPRESENTATIVE PROPOSED A MEETING ON JULY 7, AND THE COMMITTEE MET AND EXCHANGED VIEWS WITH

again we are talking with USIA. He just saw PRG.

*Christ!
no!*

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THE PRG (APP JULY 9 REPORT COVERED THE MEETING AND THE COMMITTEE'S COMMUNIQUE ON THE MEETING IS BEING FORWARDED BY AIR POUCH.) MINH SAID THAT THEY HAD STILL HAD NO RESPONSE FROM THE GVN REPRESENTATIVE, BUT HE INTENDE TO CALL VIEN SHORTLY,

2. MINH SAID THAT THE "COMMITTEE FOR PEACE AND DEMOCRATIC LIBERTIES IN SOUTH VIETNAM" HAD BEEN FORMED OUT OF A GREAT VARIETY OF VIETNAMESE ORGANIZATIONS IN FRANCE. HIS GROUP (LIAISON COMMITTEE OF THE CENTRIST FORCES OF SOUTH VIETNAM) HAD BEEN INSTRUMENTAL IN EFFECTING THE FORMATION OF THE COMMITTEE BECAUSE IT HAD REMOVED THE PRINCIPAL STUMBLING BLOCK WHEN IT OBTAINED THE EXCLUSION OF THE SOCIETY F VIETNAMESE RESIDENTS IN FRANCE AS TOO CLOSE AND OBVIOUS A PUPPET OF THE PRG. MINH COMMENTED THAT THE COMMITTEE CONTINUED TO HAVE AN EXCESSIVELY LEFTIST FLAVOR, AND HE THOUGHT THAT THE EVOLUTION WOULD BE IN A MORE REASONABLE DIRECTION AS THE MOVEMENT ACQUIRED GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES. MINH SAID THAT BECAUSE OF THE VARIETY OF PARTICIPANTS, THERE WAS NO LEADER OF THE COMMITTEE, BUT HE THOUGHT THAT EVENTUALLY THICH THIEN CHAU (ASSOCIATION OF OVERSEAS VIETNAMESE BUDDHISTS) WOULD BECOME THE RELIGIOUS AND CULTURAL LEADER AND HE (MINH) WOULD BECOME THE POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC LEADER,

3. MINH SAID THAT HE CONTINUED TO REGRET THE LACK OF RESPONSIVENESS ON THE PART OF THE GVN. HE HAD TALKED WITH DR. TRAN VAN DO AND PARTICULARLY WITH NGUYEN NGOC HUY, BUT TO DATE THERE HAD BEEN NO INDICATION ON ANY SOFTENING OF SAIGON'S POSITION VIS-A-VIS THE "THIRD FORCE." MINH HOPED THAT THE GVN MIGHT SOON REALIZE THE NECESSITY OF SOME POLITICAL COMPROMISE AND AGREE TO ACCEPT A VISIT FROM NGUYEN DE (SEE REFTEL) O WORK OUT A ROLE FOR THE "THIRD FORCE" ELEMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND ABROAD. MINH THOUGHT THAT INDICATIONS OF ACCEPTANCE OF SOME "THIRD FORCE" LEADERS BY THE US AND DRV MIGHT INDICATE FORCEFULLY TO PRESIDENT THEIU THAT HE SHOULD DEAL WITH THE "THIRD FORCE" AS ONE OF THE ELEMENTS INVOLVED IN THE NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND CONCORD, AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE JANUARY PARIS AGREEMENTS.

4. MINH SAID THAT HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH THE DRV LEADERS

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HAD MADE IT CLEAR TO HIM THAT AN ACCEPTABLE POLITICAL EVOLUTION IN SOUTH VIETNAM WAS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF THE DRV WILLINGNESS TO ABIDE BY OTHER PARIS AGREEMENT PROVISIONS CONCERNING INDOCHINA, UNTIL SVN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS WERE ON A GOOD PATH, MINH DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THE DRV WOULD PERMIT THE RESOLUTION OF THE LAOS AND CAMBODIAN PROBLEMS.

5. MINH SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN INVITED FOR DINNER ALONE WITH PRG REPRESENTATIVE HIEU ON JULY 12. IF THE US HAD ANY VIEWS OF WHICH HE SHOULD BE AWARE BEFORE THIS DINNER, HE WOULD APPRECIATE BEING INFORMED. EMBOFF REPEATED THE USUAL POSITION THAT THE US BELIEVED INTERNAL SOUTH VIETNAMESE PROBLEMS SHOULD BE SOLVED BY THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE THEMSELVES, AND US FAVORED A SITUATION IN WHICH THERE WOULD BE THE LEAST OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE. MINH SAID THAT IN ANY CASE HE WOULD INFORM EMBOFF JULY 13 IF ANYTHING DEVELOPED IN HIS CONVERSATION WITH HIEU.

6. IF DEPT OR SAIGON BELIEVE WE SHOULD ENCOURAGE MINH BY INDICATING ANY US VIEWS PRIOR TO HIS CONTACT WITH PRG, WE WOULD APPRECIATE A CABLE BEFORE COG JULY 12.
IRWIN

*no / Break contact
immediately and
forever!*

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ACTION EA-14

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ADP-00 IO-13 DPW-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00
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PRS-01 SS-15 USIA-12 RSR-01 /119 W

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R 041055Z JUL 73
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1525
INFO AMEMBASSY SAIGON

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 18363

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINT, VS
SUBJECT: VIEWS OF TWO SOUTH VIETNAMESE "THIRD FORCE" LEADERS IN PARIS

REF: PARIS 17915

1. SUMMARY: SOUTH VIETNAMESE "THIRD FORCE" LEADERS MINH AND CHAU TOLD EMBOFF THEY WERE CONCERNED ABOUT THE LACK OF PROGRESS ON THE POLITICAL FRONT IN SVN AND FELT THAT TIME RUNS AGAINST THE NON-COMMUNISTS. THEY THOUGHT THAT AN INTERMEDIARY DRAWN FROM "THIRD FORCE" LEADERS MIGHT BE ABLE TO FACILITATE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN ATMOSPHERE OF CONFIDENCE BETWEEN THE GVN AND PRG NEGOTIATORS TO PERMIT SUBSTANTIVE, SECRET EXCHANGES. THEY WERE PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN STIMULATING GVN TO POLITICIZE THE DISPUTE WITH THE COMMUNISTS, BUT GAVE NO INDICATION THAT THE MULTIPLICITY OF DISSIDENTS WERE ANY MORE PREPARED TO COOPERATE WITH EACH OTHER -- OR THE GVN -- THAN BEFORE. END SUMMARY.

2. EMBOFF HAD CONVERSATION RECENTLY WITH PARIS-BASED "THIRD FORCE" FIGURES, HO THONG MINH (FORMER GVN DEFENSE MINISTER) AND NGUYEN HUU CHAU (FORMER GVN INTERIOR MINISTER). MINH/CHAU BELIEVED THAT THE GVN WAS UNDER THE ERRONEOUS IMPRESSION THAT TIME WAS IN FAVOR OF THE NON-COMMUNISTS, AND GVN COULD POSTPONE ANY POLITICAL ACTIONS INDEFINITELY. MINH/CHAU THOUGHT THERE WAS A STRONG POSSIBILITY THAT WITH REDUCTION IN US AID, THE

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ECONOMIC SITUATION IN THE GVN-CONTROLLED AREAS WOULD DETERIORATE WITH CORRESPONDING POLITICAL EFFECT SO THAT IN A FEW YEARS' TIME, COMMUNISTS (WITH THEIR ECONOMY MUCH LESS DEPENDENT ON FOREIGN AID) WOULD BECOME COMPARATIVELY STRONGER. MINH/CHAU THEREFORE THOUGHT IT ESSENTIAL FOR GVN TO PERMIT AND EVEN TO PROMOTE POLITICAL EVOLUTION NOW WHEN NON-COMMUNIST POSITION WAS STRONGER. EMBOFF NOTED THAT JUNE 28 PRG PROPOSALS (INCLUDING, IN RESPONSE TO PRESS QUESTIONS, THE REFUSAL TO ENGAGE IN ANY SERIOUS, SECRET NEGOTIATIONS), SUGGESTED THAT COMMUNISTS MIGHT WELL NOT BE RESPONSIVE TO POLITICAL OVERTURES.

3. MINH/CHAU ADMITTED RECENT PRG PROPOSALS (REFTEL) WERE NOT FORTHCOMING, BUT THEY THOUGHT THAT THIS WAS THE RESULT OF AN EVEN WORSE ATMOSPHERE IN THE GVN/PRG BILATERALS THAN HAD EXISTED FOLLOWING JANUARY 27 AGREEMENT. GVN POSTPONEMENT OF MEETING FOR TWO WEEKS, ONE-THIRD OF THE PERIOD FOR ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE TASK OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, WAS DISCOURAGING, GVN ACTIONS SUCH AS JUNE 11 SENATE ELECTION LEGISLATION FURTHER DIMINISHED THE PRG HOPES THAT THE GVN WOULD BE WILLING TO PLAY AN HONEST POLITICAL GAME.

4. MINH SAID THAT THE LACK OF PROGRESS IN THE BILATERALS HAD SUGGESTED TO THEM THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE SOMEONE ENJOYING THE CONFIDENCE OF BOTH SIDES PROVIDE GOOD OFFICES AS AN INTERMEDIARY TO TRY TO MOVE THEM TOWARD MORE MEANINGFUL, PROBABLY SECRET CONTACTS. SUCH "THIRD FORCE" PERSON COULD THEN EITHER PARTICIPATE IN CONVERSATIONS OR GRACEFULLY WITHDRAW. MINH SUGGESTED EITHER NGUYEN HUU CHAU OR NGUYEN DE THE LATTER HAD THE DISADVANTAGE OF BEING A NORTHERNER WHO HAD BEEN CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH BAO DAI, BUT HE HAD ADVANTAGE OF HAVING BEEN IN RECENT YEARS MORE ALOOF FROM SVN POLITICS, AND IN PARTICULAR HAD NOT CRITICIZED THE GVN AS HAD CHAU. MINH SAID THEY FOUND IT HARD TO UNDERSTAND WHY THIEU SHOULD MISINTERPRET THEIR POSITIONS. IT WAS CLEAR THAT MINH/CHAU AND MANY OTHERS WERE NOT COMMUNISTS AND WOULD BE AMONG THOSE ELIMINATED IF COMMUNISTS TOOK POWER. MINH SAID THAT THEIR EFFORTS TO BUILD SOME RELATIONSHIP WITH COMMUNISTS WAS BASED ON ADVICE FROM SOUVANNA PHOUMA THAT OBTAINING CONFIDENCE OF COMMUNISTS TOOK CONSIDERABLE EFFORT, BUT FELLOW NON-COMMUNISTS SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT LESS DIVIDED THEM THAN UNITED THEM IN BASIC CONFLICT WITH COMMUNISTS. HENCE, "THIRD FORCE" DIFFERENCES

*a need
and
completely
spontaneous*

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WITH THIEU WERE NOT THE RESULT OF CONFLICT OVER WHO WOULD HEAD GVN, BUT OVER WHAT POLICIES WOULD DO MOST TO BLOCK A COMMUNIST TAKEOVER. "THIRD FORCE" SHARED THIEU'S GOALS, BUT QUESTIONED HIS MEANS.

5. MINH SAID THAT THEY WERE MAKING EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH CLOSER CONTACTS WITH OTHER "THIRD FORCE" LEADERS OUTSIDE SVN, PARTICULARLY WITH THOSE IN THE US. IT WAS MOST IMPORTANT, HOWEVER, FOR THEM TO BE ABLE TO ENGAGE IN MORE OF A DIALOGUE WITH "THIRD FORCE" LEADERS WITHIN SVN, SUCH AS GENERAL DUONG VAN MINH. IT WAS NOW IMPOSSIBLE FOR THEM TO HAVE A SUBSTANTIVE POLITICAL EXCHANGE GIVEN THE CLOSE SURVEILLANCE THE GVN EXERCISED OVER "THIRD FORCE" PERSONALITIES WITHIN SVN.

6. COMMENT: EMOFF PRIMARILY LISTENED TO THEIR VIEWS, BUT EMPHASIZED THAT NICETIES OF SVN INTERNAL POLITICS WERE BEST RESOLVED BY SOUTH VIETNAMESE THEMSELVES. MINH/CHAU GAVE NO INDICATION THAT THEY OR THE OTHER CONTENDERS FOR THE TITLE OF "MR. THIRD COMPONENT" WERE ANY MORE PREPARED TO COOPERATE WITH EACH OTHER -- OR THE GVN -- THAN EVER.

IRWIN

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ACTION EA-14

INFO UCT-01 AUP-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-02 INR-10 L-03
NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-15 USIA-12
DPW-01 AID-20 EB-11 TRSE-00 IGA-02 RSR-01 /114 N

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P 281935Z JUN 73
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 90
INFO AMEMBASSY SAIGON PRIORITY

FILE COPY

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- V.T.G. _____
- WALSH _____

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E.O.: 11652: N/A
TAGS: VS, PINT
SUBJ: GVN-PRG BILATERALS: 14TH PLENARY SESSION, JUNE 28

1. AT THE FIRST BILATERAL SESSION SINCE MAY 30 BOTH SIDES PUT FORTH NEW PROPOSALS, AS FOLLOWS:
2. GVN--DEPUTY PRIMIN VIEN PROPOSED CREATION OF FOUR COMMISSIONS TO BE CONCERNED WITH GUARANTEEING DEMOCRATIC FREEDOMS, FORMATION OF THE NCNRC, ORGANIZATION OF FREE ELECTIONS, AND ARMED FORCES IN SVN RESPECTIVELY. HE HELD THAT QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE CEASE-FIRE AND RETURN OF DETAINEES SHOULD BE LEFT TO THE TPJMC. THE FOUR COMMISSIONS WOULD HOLD CLOSED SESSIONS WHILE PARALLEL PLENARY SESSIONS CONTINUED, SO THAT A COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT IN SVN POLITICAL QUESTIONS COULD BE SIGNED JULY 28.
3. THEREFORE, THE FOLLOWING CALENDAR OF DEVELOPMENTS WOULD TAKE EFFECT, CULMINATING IN GENERAL ELECTIONS DECEMBER 25:

JULY 28--REMOVAL OF WARTIME RESTRICTIONS ON DEMOCRATIC FREEDOMS; BEGINNING OF WITHDRAWAL OF

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NON-SVN ARMED FORCES; BEGINNING OF REDUCTION
OF SVN ARMED FORCES;

SEPTEMBER 11--INAUGURAL NCRNC SESSION; COMPLETION
OF WITHDRAWAL OF NON-SVN ARMED FORCES; COMPLETION
OF REDUCTION OF SVN ARMED FORCES;

OCTOBER 26--PROMULGATION OF ELECTORAL LAW

DECEMBER 26--GENERAL ELECTIONS

4. PRG--HIEU'S REMARKS, WHICH WERE REplete WITH STERN CRITICISMS OF ALLGED SVN VIOLATIONS OF THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE, EMPHASIZED PRIORITY SETTLEMENT OF MILITARY ISSUES, THROUGH APPLICATION OF THE CEASE-FIRE, DELIMITATION OF ZONES AND CORRIDORS, ETC. THE SECOND AND THIRD PRG "URGENT MEASURES" WERE FOR RETURN OF CAPTURED AND DETAINED PERSONNEL AND RESTORATION OF FREEDOMS. THE LATTER INCLUDED CONCURRENT PUBLICATION OF BOTH PARTIES OF DECREES AUTHORIZING FREE EXERCISE OF POLITICAL ACTIVITY AND "FREE CIRCULATION OF NEWSPAPERS" BETWEEN ZONES.

5. UNDER THE PRG PROPOSALS THE NCRNC WOULD BE FORMED BY END OF JULY, WOULD MONITOR APPLICATION OF THE CEASE-FIRE AND RESTORATION OF FREEDOMS THROUGH RECEIPT OF REPORTS, INVESTIGATIONS, AND MAKING RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE PARTIES. THE COUNCIL WOULD CONSIST OF 36 MEMBERS, WITH EACH SVN PARTY DESIGNATING 12 AND DESIGNATION OF THE THIRD COMPONENT LEFT UNSPECIFIED. MOREOVER, THE COUNCIL WOULD HAVE A "PRESIDIUM" OF 6 MEMBERS (2 FROM EACH COMPONENT) WITH THE CHAIRMANSHIP ROTATING IN TURN AMONG 3 OF THESE 6. NATIONAL ELECTIONS WOULD BE ORGANIZED BY THE COUNCIL "WHEN AN EFFECTIVE CEASE-FIRE HAS BEEN APPLIED AND DEMOCRATIC LIBERTIES FULLY GUARANTEED."

6. CONCERNING ARMED FORCES IN SVN, HIEU PROPOSED THAT THE TWO PARTIES CARRY OUT REDUCTIONS AND, AFTER A GOVERNMENT IS FORMED THROUGH GENERAL ELECTIONS, MERGE THEIR FORCES INTO NEW, UNIFIED NATIONAL ARMED SERVICES.

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Aug 20 73

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Bored on Paris 22140
(Aug 17 73). I called
Wenzel on Aug 20 &
told him I instructed
Pratt to cease &
desist from "Bad news"
contacts in Paris.

WJH